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Abstract
Due to resource restricted sensor nodes, it is important
to minimize the amount of data transmission among sen-
sor networks. To reduce the amount of sending data, an
aggregation approach can be applied along the path from
sensors to the sink. However, as sensor networks are often
deployed in untrusted and even hostile environments, sen-
sor nodes are prone to node compromise attacks. Hence,
an end-to-end secure aggregation approach is required to
ensure a healthy data reception. In this paper, we propose
two layers for secure data aggregation in sensor networks.
Firstly, we provide an end-to-end encryption scheme that
supports operations over cypher-text. It is based on el-
liptic curve cryptography that exploits a smaller key size,
allows the use of higher number of operations on cypher-
texts, and prevents the distinction between two identical
texts from their cryptograms. Secondly, we propose a
new watermarking-based authentication that enables sen-
sor nodes to ensure the identity of other nodes they are
communicating with. Our experiments show that our hy-
brid approach of secure data aggregation enhances the se-
curity, significantly reduces computation and communi-
cation overhead, and can be practically implemented in
on-the-shelf sensor platforms.
1 Introduction
A typical sensor network is expected to consist of a large
number of sensor nodes deployed randomly in a large
scale. Usually, these nodes have limited power, storage,
communication, and processing capabilities, making en-
ergy consumption an issue.
A major functionality of a sensor node is to measure
environmental values using embedded sensors, and trans-
mit it to a base station called ”sink”. The sensed data
needs to be analyzed, which eventually serves to initiate
some action. Almost this analysis presumes computation
of the maximum, minimum, average, etc. It can be ei-
ther done at the base station or by the nodes themselves,
in a hierarchical scenario. In order to reduce the amount
of data to be transmitted to the sink, it is beneficial that
this analysis can be done over the network itself. To save
the overall energy resources of the network, it is agreed
that the sensed data needs to be aggregated on the way
to its final destination. Sensor nodes send their values to
certain special nodes, i.e., aggregators. Each aggregator
then condenses the data prior to sending it on. In terms of
bandwidth and energy consumption, aggregation is bene-
ficial as long as the aggregation process is not too central
processing unit (CPU) intensive. The aggregators can ei-
ther be special (more powerful) nodes or regular sensors
nodes.
At the same time, sensor networks are often deployed
in public or otherwise untrusted and even hostile environ-
ments, which prompts a number of security issues (e.g.,
key management, privacy, access control, authentication,
etc.). Then, if security is a necessary in other (e.g., wired
or MANET) types of networks, it is much more so in sen-
sor networks. Actually, it is one of the most popular re-
search topic in this field and many advances have been
reported on in recent years.
From the above observations, we can notice the impor-
tance of a cooperative secure data aggregation in sensor
networks. In other terms, after the data gathering and
during transmissions to the base station, each node along
the routing path cooperatively integrates and secures the
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fragments messages. Therefore, secure data aggregation
protocols require sensor nodes to encrypt or authenticate
any sensed data prior to its transmission, implement data
aggregation at every intermediate node (without decryp-
tion), and prefer data to be decrypted by the sink so that
energy efficiency is maximized.
The benefit and vulnerability, as well as the need to
secure in-network aggregation, have been identified by
numerous schemes in the literature. One approach [37]
proposed a secure information aggregation protocol to
answer queries over the data acquired by the sensors.
Even though their method provided data authentication to
guarantee secrecy, the data still sent in plain text format,
which removes the privacy during transmission. Another
one [10] proposed a secure energy efficient data aggrega-
tion (ESPDA) to prevent redundant data transmission in
data aggregation. Unlike conventional techniques, their
scheme prevents the redundant transmission from sensor
nodes to the aggregator. Before transmitting sensed data,
each sensor transmits a secure pattern to the aggregator.
Only sensors with different data are allowed to transmit
their data to the cluster-head. However, since each sen-
sor at least needs to transmit a packet containing a pattern
once, power cannot be significantly saved. In addition,
each sensor node uses a fixed encryption key to encrypt
data, which can lead to severe security flaws. In [26],
the authors presented a secure encrypted-data aggregation
scheme for wireless sensor networks. The idea is based
on eliminating redundant sensor readings without using
encryption and maintains data secrecy and privacy during
transmission. This scheme saves energy on sensor nodes
but still do not guarantee the privacy of sent data.
In this paper, we provide for the first time an hybrid
approach for secure data aggregation in sensor networks.
Firstly, our approach ensures that secrecy of sensed data
is never disclosed to unauthorized parties by providing a
secure homomorphic cypher-system that allows efficient
aggregation of encrypted data. We show that our encryp-
tion method allows many operations over cypher-texts
that prevents data decryption at intermediate nodes (ag-
gregators) and reduces energy consumption. Secondly,
we extend our homomorphic secure data aggregation level
to two layers hierarchical data aggregation protocol, by
including a watermarking-based authentication level. To
assess the practicality of our technique, we evaluate it and
compare it to existing cypher-system. The obtained re-
sults show that we significantly reduce computation and
communication overhead as well as our secure aggrega-
tion method can be practically implemented in on-the-
shelf sensor platforms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After
having recalled some previous related work in the fields
of data confidentiality and authentication, the next section
introduces our two security layers. In Section 4 the first
one, namely the secure data aggregation using an almost
fully homomorphic cryptosystem over elliptic curves, is
presented in detail. Its security is evaluated qualitatively
and through experiments in Section 4.6. In the next sec-
tion, our second complementary approach for security in
WSN is proposed. This is a nodes authentication proto-
col based on information hiding security field. Advanced
notions of security are taken from this field and translated
in WSN terms. Then an existing authentication scheme is
evaluated and improved in Section 5.3. Finally, in Section
5.4, a new secure authentication method based on water-
marking is proposed and evaluated. This research work
ends by a conclusion section, where our contribution is
summarized and intended future work is presented.
2 Security in sensor networks
Because sensor networks may interact with sensitive data
and be deployed in hostile unattended environments, it
is imperative to protect sensitive information transmitted
by sensor nodes. Moreover, wireless sensor networks in-
troduce severe resource constraints due to their lack of
data storage and power. Therefore, they have security
problems that traditional networks (computer security) do
not face and there are many security considerations that
should be investigated. In this paper, we treat the essential
security requirements that are raised in a wireless sensor
network environment, mainly: data confidentiality, node
authentication, and how they relate with data aggregation
process.
2.1 Data confidentiality
In critical applications, data confidentiality ensures that
secrecy of transmitted data is never disclosed to unau-
thorized parties. Therefore, it is very important to build
secure channels between sensor networks. The standard
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technique for keeping sensitive data secret is to encrypt
them such that only intended receivers can realize decryp-
tion, hence achieving confidentiality.
Data encryption becomes necessary in sensor networks
when this type of sensors can be subject of many types of
attacks [15]. Without encryption, adversaries can monitor
and inject false data into the network. In a general manner
the encryption process is done as follows: sensor nodes
must encrypt data on a hop-by-hop basis. An intermediate
node (i.e., aggregator) possessing the keys of all sending
nodes, decrypts the received encrypted value, aggregates
all received values, and encrypts the result for transmis-
sion to the base station. Though viable, this approach is
fairly expensive and complicated, due to the fact of de-
crypting each received value before aggregation, which
generates an overhead imposed by key management and
prevents end-to-end data confidentiality.
Some privacy homomorphism based researches have
been proposed recently [12, 21, 1] that, without partici-
pating in checking, the aggregators can directly aggregate
the encrypted data. The problem of aggregating encrypted
data in sensor networks was introduced in [21] and further
refined in [12]. The authors propose to use homomorphic
encryption schemes to enable arithmetic operations over
cypher-texts that need to be transmitted in a multi-hop
manner. However, these approaches provide a higher level
of system security, since nodes would not be equipped
with private keys, which would limit the advantage gained
by an attacker compromising some of the nodes. Unfor-
tunately, existing privacy homomorphisms used for data
aggregation in sensor networks have exponential bound
in computation. For instance, Rivest Shamir Adleman
(RSA) based cryptosystems [25, 31] are used, which re-
quire high CPU and memory capabilities to perform ex-
ponential operations. It is too computationally expensive
to implement in sensor nodes. Moreover, the expansion in
bit size during the transformation of plain text to cypher-
text introduces costly communication overhead, which di-
rectly translates to a faster depletion of the sensors energy.
On the other hand and from security viewpoint, the cryp-
tosystems [19] used in these approaches were cryptanal-
ized [16, 41], which means they cannot guarantee any-
more high security levels.
In this paper we try to relax the statements above by
investigating elliptic curve cryptography that allows fea-
sible and suitable data aggregation in sensor networks be-
side the security of homomorphisms schemes. First of all,
our proposed scheme for secure data aggregation in sensor
networks is based on a cryptosystem that has been proven
safe and has not been cryptanalyzed. Indeed, it is known
to be the sole secure and almost fully homomorphic cryp-
tosystem usable now. Another property that enforces the
security level of such an approach is coming from the fact
that, as it is the case in ElGamal cryptosystem, for two
identical messages it generates two different cryptograms.
This property suggested fundamental for security in sen-
sor networks [8, 26, 30], to the best of our knowledge,
was not addressed in previous homomorphism-based se-
curity data aggregation researches. Beside all these prop-
erties and due to the use of elliptic curves, our approach
saves energy by allowing nodes to encrypt and aggre-
gate data without the need of high computations. Lastly,
the scheme we use allows more aggregations types over
cypher data than the homomorphic cryptosystems used
until now. This approach is detailed in Section 4 and is
evaluated in Section 4.6.
2.2 Node authentication
In wireless sensors networks an adversary can change
the whole packet stream by injecting additional packets.
Therefore, the receiver needs to ensure that the data used
in any decision-making process originates from the cor-
rect source. Without authentication, an adversary could
masquerade a node, thus gaining unauthorized access to
resource and sensitive information, and interfering with
the operation of other nodes. Moreover, a compromised
node may send data to its data aggregator under several
fake identities so that the integrity of the aggregated data
is corrupted. Node authentication enables a sensor node
to ensure the identity of the peer node it is communicat-
ing with. In the case of only two-nodes communication,
authentication can be achieved through a purely symmet-
ric key cryptography: the sender and the receiver share
a secret key to compute the message authentication code
(MAC) of all communicated data.
In-network processing presents a critical challenge for
data authentication in wireless sensor networks. Current
schemes relying on MAC cannot provide natural support
for this operation, because a MAC computation is a very
energy-consuming operation. Additionally, even a slight
modification to the data invalidates the MAC.
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The authors in [36] propose a key-chain distribution
system for their µTESLA secure broadcast protocol. The
basic idea of the µTESLA system is to achieve asymmet-
ric cryptography by delaying the disclosure of the sym-
metric keys. In this case a sender will broadcast a mes-
sage generated with a secret key. After a certain period
of time, the sender will disclose the secret key. The re-
ceiver is responsible for buffering the packet until the se-
cret key has been disclosed. After disclosure the receiver
can authenticate the packet, provided that the packet was
received before the key was disclosed. One major limi-
tation of µTESLA is that some initial information must
be unicast to each sensor node before authentication of
broadcast messages can begin.
In [42] a new way to achieve authentication through
wireless sensor networks is introduced. It is based on
digital watermarking and proposes an end-to-end, statis-
tical approach for data authentication that provides inher-
ent support for in-network processing. In this scheme,
authentication information is modulated as a watermark
and superposed on the sensory data at the sensor nodes.
The key idea formerly presented in [42] is to visualize the
sensory data at a certain time snapshot as an image. Each
sensor node is viewed as a pixel and its value corresponds
to the gray level of the pixel. Due to this equivalence, in-
formation hiding techniques can be used to authenticate a
wireless sensor network.
In some well-defined situations, the watermarked data
can be aggregated by the intermediate nodes without in-
curring any in route checking. In this context, aggregation
is for instance related to DCT or DWT compression, that
is, to any operation over images that is able to reduce their
weights without removing the watermarks. Upon recep-
tion of the sensory data, the sink is able to authenticate
the data by finding and validating the watermark, thereby
detecting whether the data has been illegitimately altered.
In this way, the aggregation-survivable authentication in-
formation is only added at the sources and checked by
the data sink, without any involvement of intermediate
nodes. To realize such an authentication, the authors of
[42] propose to use a data hiding scheme based on spread
spectrum techniques. In their proposal, ”each sensor node
embeds part of the whole watermark into its sensory data,
while leaving the heavy computational load of watermark
detection at the sink”. Moreover, as stated before, their
scheme supports in-network aggregation. Such an ap-
proach, its issues and security consequences, and how to
improve their scheme, are detailed in the last sections of
this research work.
3 Tree-based data aggregation
Data aggregation schemes aim to combine and summa-
rize data packets of several sensor nodes so that amount
of data transmission is reduced. An example of data ag-
gregation schemes is the tree based data aggregation pro-
tocol as presented in Figure 1 where sensor nodes col-
lect information from a region of interest. When the user
(sink) queries the network, instead of sending each sen-
sor node’s data to the base station, aggregators collect the
information from its neighboring nodes, aggregates them,
and send the aggregated data to the base station over a
multihop path.
Figure 1: Tree-based data aggregation in sensor networks
The main objective of data aggregation is to increase
the network lifetime by reducing the resource consump-
tion of sensor nodes, especially the battery energy and
bandwidth. While increasing network lifetime, data ag-
gregation protocols might take into account an important
quality of service metric: the security. Therefore, encryp-
tion of the sensed data before its transmission becomes
necessary and it is preferable to decrypt the data only at
the base station level. In the next section, we present our
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model for sensor data encryption compliant with this re-
quirement.
4 Sensor data encryption using fully
homomorphic cryptosystem
In this work, we are primarily concerned with data privacy
in sensor networks. Our goal is to prevent attackers from
gaining any information about sensor data. Therefore, en-
suring an end-to-end privacy between sensor nodes and
the sink becomes problematic. This is largely because
popular and existing cyphers are not additively homomor-
phic. In other words, the summation of encrypted data
does not allow for the retrieval of the sum of the plain text
values. Moreover, privacy existing homomorphisms have
usually exponential bound in computation. To overcome
this problem, in our model we propose a security scheme
for sensor networks using elliptic curve based cryptosys-
tem. We show that our model permits many operations on
encrypted data and does not demand high sensor capabil-
ities and computation.
4.1 Operations over Elliptic Curves
In this section, we give a brief introduction to elliptic
curve cryptography. The reader is referred to [24] for
more details.
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is an approach to
public-key cryptography based on the algebraic structure
of elliptic curves over finite fields [24]. Elliptic curves
used in cryptography are typically defined over two types
of finite fields: prime fields Fp, where p is a large prime
number, and binary extension fields F2m [17]. In our pa-
per, we focus on elliptic curves over Fp. Let p > 3, then
an elliptic curve over Fp is defined by a cubic equation
y2 = x3 + ax + b as the set
E =
{
(x, y) ∈ Fp × Fp, y2 ≡ x3 + ax + b (mod p)
}
where a, b ∈ Fp are constants such that 4a3 + 27b2 .
0 (mod p). An elliptic curve over Fp consists of the set
of all pairs of affine coordinates (x, y) for x, y ∈ Fp that
satisfy an equation of the above form and an infinity point
O.
The point addition and its special case, point doubling
over E is defined as follows (the arithmetic operations are
defined in Fp) [24] :
Let P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) be two points of E.
Then:
P + Q =
{ O if x2 = x1 and y2 = −y1,
(x3, y3) otherwise.
(1)
Algorithm 1 Keys generation program in Python/Sage.
1: def GG1e(n):
2: l = 1
3: p = l*n-1
4: while not isprime(p) or not p%3 == 2:
5: l += 1
6: p += n
7: F = GF(p)
8: H = EllipticCurve(F, [0, 1])
9: X = H.gen(0)
10: g = l*X
11: G,y = [],g
12: flag = True
13: while flag:
14: y = randint(0,n-1)*g
15: if y.order() == n:
16: G.append(y)
17: if len(G) == 2:
18: flag = False
19: return G,p
20:
21: def G(t):
22: q1 = generatePrime(t)
23: q2 = generatePrime(t)
24: n = q1*q2
25: GG,p = GG1e(n)
26: return (q1,q2,GG,p)
27:
28: def KeyGen(bits):
29: (q1,q2,GG,p) = G(bits)
30: n = q1*q2
31: g,u = GG
32: h = q2*u
33: return ((n,G,g,h,p),q1)
where:
• x3 = λ2 − x1 − x2,
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• y3 = λ × (x1 − x3) − y1,
λ =
{
(y2 − y1) × (x2 − x1)−1 if P , Q ,
(3x21 + a) × (2y1)−1 if P = Q. (2)
Finally, we define P + O = O + P = P,∀P ∈ E, which
leads to an abelian group (E,+). On the other hand the
multiplication n×P means P+P+ ....+P n times and −P
is the symmetric of P for the group law + defined above
for all P ∈ E.
4.2 Public/Private Keys Generation with
ECC
In this section we show how we can generate the public
and private keys for encryption, following the cryptosys-
tem proposed by Boneh et al. [8]. The analysis of the
complexity will be treated in a later section.
Let τ > 0 be an integer called “security parameter”.
To generate public and private keys, first of all, two τ-bits
prime numbers must be computed. Therefore, a crypto-
graphic pseudo-random generator can be used to obtain
two vectors of τ bits, q1 and q2. Then, a Miller-Rabin test
can be applied for testing the primality or not of q1 and q2.
We denote by n the product of q1 and q2, n = q1q2, and
by l the smallest positive integer such that p = l× n− 1. l
is a prime number while p = 2 (mod 3).
In order to find the private and public keys, we define a
group H, which presents the points of the super-singular
elliptic curve y2 = x3 + 1 defined over Fp. It consists of
p + 1 = n × l points, and thus has a subgroup of order n,
we call it G. In another step, we compute g and u as two
generators of G and h = q2 × u. Then, following [8], the
public key will be presented by (n,G, g, h) and the private
key by q1.
To give illustration of such a keys generation, a pro-
gram is presented in Algorithm 1. It is written with the
Python 2.6 language and the Sage library to manipulate
elliptic curves. The randint(a,b) function is provided
by the random library; it generates an integer randomly
picked into the interval [a, b]. The generatePrime(n) func-
tion is not detailed here. It receives an integer n as its
input argument and generates a prime number of n bits.
4.3 Encryption and Decryption
After the private/public keys generation, we proceed now
to the two encryption and decryption phases:
• Encryption : Assuming that our messages space
consists of integers in the set {0, 1, ...,T}, where T <
q2, and m the (integer) message to encrypt. Firstly,
a random positive integer is picked from the interval
[0,n − 1]. Then, the cypher-text is defined by
C = m × g + r × h ∈ G,
in which + and × refer to the addition and multipli-
cation laws defined previously.
• Decryption : Once the message C arrived to destina-
tion, to decrypt it, we use the private key q1 and the
discrete logarithm of (q1 ×C) base q1 × g as follows:
m = logq1×g q1 × C.
This takes expected time
√
T using Pollard’s lambda
method. Moreover, this decryption can be speed-up
by precomputing a table of powers of q1 × g.
Algorithm 2 Python program for Encryption and Decryp-
tion
1: def Encrypt(Kp, M):
2: (n,G,g,h,p) = Kp
3: r = randint(0,n-1)
4: return M*g+r*h
5:
6: def Decrypt(Kp,Ks,C):
7: (n,G,g,h,p), q1 = Kp, Ks
8: P = q1*g
9: return P.discrete-log(q1*C)
10:
11: def Decrypt-product(Kp,Ks,C):
12: (n,G,g,h,p), q1 = Kp, Ks
13: g1 = modified-weil(g,g,p)
14: return log(C,g1)
In Algorithm 2 is detailed an example of encryption and
decryption programs in Python/Sage. The modified weil
and discrete log functions are provided by Sage.
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4.4 Homomorphic Properties
As we mentioned before, our approach ensures easy en-
cryption/decryption without any need of extra resources.
This will be proved in the next section. Moreover, our
approach supports homomorphic properties, which gives
us the ability to execute operations on values even though
they have been encrypted. Indeed, it allows N additions
and one multiplication directly on cryptograms, which
prevents the decryption phase at the aggregators level and
saves nodes energy, which is crucial in sensor networks.
Additions over cypher-texts are done as follows: let m1
and m2 be two messages and C1,C2 their cypher-texts re-
spectively. Then the sum of C1 and C2, let’s call it C, is
represented by
C = C1 + C2 + r × h,
where r is an integer randomly chosen in [0,n − 1] and
h = q2 × u as presented in the previous section. This sum
operation guarantees that the decryption value of C is the
sum m1 +m2. The addition operation can be done several
times, which means we can do sums of encrypted sums.
The multiplication of two encrypted values and its de-
cryption are done as follows: let e be the modified Weil
pairing on the curve and g, h the points of G as defined
previously. Let us recall that this modified Weil pairing
e is obtained from the Weil pairing E [8], [7] by the for-
mula: e(P,Q) = E(x × P,Q), where x is a root of X3 − 1
on Fp2 . Then, the result of the multiplication of two en-
crypted messages C1,C2 is given by
Cm = e(C1,C2) + r × h1,
where h1 = e(g, h) and r is a random integer pick in [1,n].
The decryption of Cm is equal to the discrete logarithm
of q1 × Cm to the base q1 × g1:
m1m2 = logq1∗g1 (q1 × Cm.)
where g1 = e(g, g).
The decryption program of a product is given in Al-
gorithm 2 whereas the addition and multiplication over
cryptograms programs are given in Algorithm 3.
4.5 Encryption for Sensor Networks
Our contribution compared to existing secure data
aggregation In previous secure data aggregation pro-
Algorithm 3 Python/Sage program of homomorphic op-
erations
1: def multiply(Kp,cr1,cr2):
2: (n,G,g,h,p) = Kp
3: r = randint(0,n-1)
4: return modified-weil(cr1,cr2,p)
5: +r*modified-weil(g,h,p)
6:
7: def add(Kp,cr1,cr2):
8: (n,G,g,h,p) = Kp
9: r = randint(0,n-1)
10: return cr1+cr2+r*h
tocols, security and data aggregation are almost always
achieved together in a hop-by-hop manner. That is, data
aggregators must decrypt every message they receive, ag-
gregate the messages according to the corresponding ag-
gregation function, and encrypt the aggregation result be-
fore forwarding it. Therefore, these techniques cannot
provide data confidentiality at data aggregators and result
in latency because of the decryption/encryption process.
Figure 2: Secure data aggregation in sensor networks
In our work, we propose an encryption protocol that
performs data aggregation without requiring the decryp-
tion of the sensor data at data aggregators. We adopt the
following scenario as shown in Figure 2: after collecting
information, each sensor node encrypts its data according
to elliptic curve encryption (c.f. Section 4.1) and sends
it to the nearest aggregator. Then, aggregators aggregate
the received encrypted data (without decryption) and send
it to the base station, which in his turn decrypts the data
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and aggregates it. We notice that all aggregators can do
N additions and the final layer of aggregators can do one
multiplication on encrypted data.
4.5.1 Illustrative Examples
• Computing the Arithmetic Mean
The arithmetic mean is the ”standard” average, of-
ten simply called the ”mean”, defined for n values
x1, . . . , xn by
x¯ =
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
xi.
To compute the average of nodes measurements, ag-
gregators can calculate the sum of the encrypted
measurements and the number of nodes took these
measurements and send it to the base station. More
precisely, when using our scheme, each sensor en-
crypts its data xi to obtain cxi. The sensor then for-
wards cxi to its parent, who aggregates all the cx j’s of
its k children by simply adding them up. The result-
ing value and the encryption of k are then forwarded.
The sink can thus compute the average value with all
of these data.
• Computing the Variance
Another common aggregation is to estimate the vari-
ance of the sensed values. Let us recall that the vari-
ance of n values x1, ..., xn is defined by:
s2n =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(xi − x)2 =
1n
n∑
i=1
x2i
 − x2.
Our scheme can also be used to derive the variance
of the measured and encrypted data, by the same
method as in [11]. In this case, each sensor i must
compute yi = x2i , where xi is the measured sample,
and encrypts yi to obtain cyi. xi must also be en-
crypted, as explained in the previous section. The
sensor forwards cyi, together with cxi, to its par-
ent. The parent aggregates all the cy j of its k chil-
dren by simply adding them up. It also aggregates,
separately, the cx j, as explained in the previous sec-
tion. The two resulting values are then forwarded.
The sink ends up with values Cx =
∑n
i=1 cxi and
Cy =
∑n
i=1 cyi. Cx is used to compute the average
Av, when Cy is used to compute the variance as fol-
lows: Var = Vyn − Av2, where Vy is the decryption
of Cy.
• Computing the Weighted Mean
The weighted mean of a non-empty set of
data x1, x2, . . . , xn with non-negative weights
w1,w2, . . . ,wn, is the quantity
x¯ =
w1x1 + w2x2 + · · · + wnxn
w1 + w2 + · · · + wn .
We suppose now that each aggregator i of the first
aggregation layer has computed the mean xi of the
encrypted values received from its sensor node. Ad-
ditionally, we suppose that these aggregators are
weighted, depending on their importance. For se-
curity reasons, this weight is also encrypted and the
cypher value is denoted by wi. This wi can be pro-
portional to the number of aggregated sensors. This
weight can also illustrate the fact that two given
regions have not the same relevance. To achieve
weighted mean, each aggregator multiplies its en-
crypted mean xi with encrypted weight wi as it has
been explained previously. The resulting value is
then forwarded to the sink, which can decrypt wi×xi
and sum all these decrypted values, to obtain the
weighted mean defined above.
4.6 Evaluation of the homomorphic ap-
proach
4.6.1 Practical Issues
In this section we present some practical issues to our data
encryption model. Firstly, we study the sizes of the en-
cryption keys and we compare it to existing approaches.
Then, we show how we can optimize the sizes of cryp-
tograms in order to save more sensors energy.
Sizes of the Keys Cryptograms are points of the ellip-
tic curve E. They are constituted by couples of integer
coordinates lesser than or equal to p = lq1q2 − 1.
It is commonly accepted [5], [29] that for being secure
until 2020, a cryptosystem:
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• must have p ≈ 2161, for EC systems over Fp,
• must satisfy p ≈ 21881 for classical asymmetric sys-
tems, such as RSA or ElGamal on Fp.
Thus, for the same level of security, using elliptic curve
cryptography does not demand high keys sizes, contrary
to the case of RSA or ElGamal on Fp. The use of small
keys leads to small cryptograms and fast operations for
encryption.
Reducing the Size of Cryptograms In this section we
show how we can reduce the size of cryptograms while
using ECC. This is benefit for sensor nodes in terms of re-
ducing energy consumption by sending data with smaller
size. The messages are encrypted with q2 bits, which
leads to cryptograms with a mean of 160 bits long.
Let us suppose that p ≡ 3 ( mod 4). As the cryptogram
is an element (x, y) of E, which is defined by y2 = x3 + 1,
we can compress this cryptogram (x, y) to (x, y mod 2))
before sending it to the aggregator (as the value of y2 is
known). In this situation, we obtain cryptograms with a
mean of 81 bits long for messages between 20 and 40 bits
long.
To decompress the cryptogram (x, i), the aggregator
must compute z = x3 + 1 mod p and y =
√
z mod p,
which can be written as y = z(p+1)/4mod p, then :
• if y ≡ i(mod 2), then the decompression of (x, i) is
(x, y).
• else the decompression point is (x, p − y).
4.6.2 Security study
Due to hostile environments and unique characteristics of
sensor networks, it is a challenging task to protect sen-
sitive information transmitted by nodes to the end user.
In addition, this type of networks has security problems
that traditional networks do not face. In this section, we
outline a security study dedicated to wireless sensor net-
works.
In a sensor network environment adversaries can com-
monly use the following attacks:
Known-plain text attack: They can use common key
encryption to see when two readings are identical.
By using nearby sensors under control, attackers can
conduct a known-plain text attack.
Chosen-plain text attack: Attackers can tamper with
sensors to force them to predeterminated values.
Man-in-the-middle: They can inject false readings or
resend logged readings from legitimate sensor motes
to manipulate the data aggregation process.
In Tables 1, 2 and similar to [17], we present a com-
parison between different encryption policies and possi-
ble attacks. In our method, as data are encrypted by pub-
lic keys, and these public keys are sent by the sink to the
sole authenticated motes, the wireless sensor network is
then not vulnerable to a Man-in-the-middle attacks. On
the other hand, our approach guarantees that for two sim-
ilar texts gives two different cryptograms, which prevents
the Chosen-plain text attacks and the Man-in-the-middle
attacks. Finally, as the proposed scheme possesses the
homomorphic property, data aggregation is done without
decryption, and no private key is used in the network.
4.7 Experimental Results
4.7.1 Simulations
To show the effectiveness of our approach we conducted
a series of simulations comparing our method to another
existing one based on RSA cryptosystem. We consid-
ered a network formed of 500 sensor nodes, each one is
equipped by a battery of 100 units capacity. We consider
that the energy consumption “E” of a node is proportional
to the computational time t, i.e., E = kt. The same coef-
ficient of proportionality k is taken while comparing the
two encryption scenarii. Sensor nodes are then connected
to 50 aggregators chosen randomly. Each sensor node
choose the nearest aggregator. The running of each sim-
ulation is as follows: each sensor node takes a random
value, encrypts it using one of the encryption methods
then sends it to its aggregator. Aggregators compute the
sum of the encrypted received data and send it to the sink.
We compared our approach to the known RSA public-
key cryptographic algorithms, and we evaluated the en-
ergy consumption of the network while varying the sizes
of the keys and obviously the security levels. The energy
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Table 1: Encryption polices and vulnerabilities
Encryption Policy Possible attacks
Sensors transmit readings without encryption Man-in-the-middle
Sensors transmit encrypted readings Known-plain text attack
with permanent keys Chosen-plain text attack
Man-in-the-middle
Sensors transmit encrypted readings None of above
with dynamic keys
Our scheme None of above
Table 2: Encryption polices and aggregation
Encryption Policy Data aggregation
Sensors transmit readings without encryption Generating wrong aggregated results
Sensors transmit encrypted readings Data aggregation is impossible,
with permanent keys unless the aggregator has encryption keys
Sensors transmit encrypted readings Data aggregation cannot be achieved
with dynamic keys unless the aggregator has encryption keys
Our scheme Data aggregation can be achieved
consumption is the units of the battery used to do the en-
cryption.
Tables 3 and 4 show the energy consumption of sensor
nodes to do the encryption operations using our encryp-
tion method and the RSA one respectively. We varied the
keys sizes and obviously the security levels. A security
level is just an indicative factor of security, just to say that
level 4 provides higher security level. We notice that for
the same level of security in our approach we used small
keys while saving more energy. For instance, for high se-
curity levels (4 for example) a node using our approach
needs to use a key of 167 bits instead of 1891 in the case
of RSA and consumes 0.1 % of the battery power instead
of 3.63 %.
Tables 5 and 6 give the energy consumption E at the
aggregation stage. The same hypothesis as above have
been made, the sole difference is that aggregator nodes
have a battery of 1000 units of energy. It can be seen that
the energy needed by aggregators are between 50 and 500
times more important in the RSA-based scheme, for the
same level of security.
Security level Size p of the key E (battery units)
1 46 0.02
2 85 0.05%
3 125 0.07
4 167 0.10
Table 3: Security vs energy at the nodes level using our
approach
Security level Size of the key E (battery units)
1 472 0.08
2 945 0.53
3 1416 1.63
4 1891 3.63
Table 4: Security vs energy at the nodes level using RSA
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Security level Size p of the key E (battery units)
1 46 0.02
2 85 0.04
3 125 0.07
4 167 0.10
Table 5: Security vs energy at the aggregator level using
our approach
Security level Size of the key E (battery units)
1 472 1.13
2 945 8.09
3 1416 24.74
4 1891 56.27
Table 6: Security vs energy at the aggregator level using
RSA
Figure 3 gives the comparison between RSA and ellip-
tic curve based encryption, concerning the average energy
consumption of an aggregating wireless sensor network.
We can notice that our approach saves the energy largely
greater than the case of RSA, where its depletion is so
fast. Finally let us notice that, in addition of reducing the
amount of energy units needed for encryption and aggre-
gation, the sink receives many more values per second in
EC-based networks than in RSA-based one.
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Figure 3: Comparison of energy consumption
5 Authentication over Homomor-
phic Sensor Networks
In the previous sections, we have proposed to use a ho-
momorphism encryption scheme to support in-network
processing while preserving privacy. Compared to ex-
isting secure aggregation schemes based on homomor-
phism encryption, our method has not been cryptanalysed.
Moreover, due to the possibility to realize n additions and
one product over the cypher values, this scheme enlarges
the variety of allowing aggregation operations through
cyphertexts.
However, all of the secure homomorphism encryption
schemes only allow some specific query-based aggrega-
tion functions, e.g., sum, average, etc. Indeed data en-
cryption guarantees that only intended parties obtain the
un-encrypted plain data, it does not protect the network
from malicious or spoofed packets. Node authentication
enables a sensor node to ensure the identity of the packet’s
sender. Another way to achieve secure data aggregation in
wireless sensor networks is then to authenticate sensing
values.
Finally, an hybrid approach of secure data aggrega-
tion in wireless sensor networks can be obtained by com-
bining homomorphic encryption and watermarking-based
authentication, as it is summed up in Figure 4. In the next
section we present our proposed scheme for node authen-
tication in sensor networks.
Figure 4: Two layers secure data aggregation in sensor
networks
11
5.1 Information hiding-based authentica-
tion
In this paper we consider that authentication information
is modulated as watermark and superposed on the sensory
data at the sensor nodes. The watermarked data can be ag-
gregated by the intermediate nodes without incurring any
en route checking. Upon reception of the sensory data, the
data sink is able to authenticate the data by validating the
watermark, thereby detecting whether the data has been
illegitimately altered.
Let us firstly give some recalls concerning the informa-
tion hiding framework.
5.1.1 Robustness versus Security
Robustness and security are two major concerns in in-
formation hiding. Even if security and robustness are
neighboring concepts without clearly established defini-
tions [34], robustness is often considered to be mostly
concerned with blind elementary attacks, whereas se-
curity is not limited to certain specific attacks. In-
deed, security encompasses robustness and intentional at-
tacks [27, 18]. The best attempt to give an elegant and
concise definition for each of these two terms was pro-
posed by Kalker in [27]. Following Kalker, we will con-
sider in this research work that: “Robust watermarking is
a mechanism to create a communication channel that is
multiplexed into original content [...]. It is required that,
firstly, the perceptual degradation of the marked content
[...] is minimal and, secondly, that the capacity of the
watermark channel degrades as a smooth function of the
degradation of the marked content. [...]. Watermarking
security refers to the inability by unauthorized users to
have access to the raw watermarking channel. [...] to re-
move, detect and estimate, write or modify the raw wa-
termarking bits.” On the contrary, a fragile watermarking
is such that any alteration of the watermarked medium, as
small as possible, will lead to the destruction of the wa-
termark.
5.1.2 Information hiding security
In the framework of watermarking and steganography, se-
curity has seen several important developments since the
last decade [6, 14, 28]. The first fundamental work in
security was made by Cachin in the context of steganog-
raphy [9]. Cachin interprets the attempts of an attacker
to distinguish between an innocent image and a stego-
content as a hypothesis testing problem. In this document,
the basic properties of a stegosystem are defined using
the notions of entropy, mutual information, and relative
entropy. Mittelholzer, inspired by the work of Cachin,
proposed the first theoretical framework for analyzing the
security of a watermarking scheme [33].
These efforts to bring a theoretical framework for se-
curity in steganography and watermarking have been fol-
lowed up by Kalker, who tries to clarify the concepts (ro-
bustness vs. security), and the classifications of water-
marking attacks [27]. This work has been deepened by
Furon et al., who have translated Kerckhoffs’ principle
(Alice and Bob shall only rely on some previously shared
secret for privacy), from cryptography to data hiding [20].
They used Diffie and Hellman methodology, and Shan-
non’s cryptographic framework [38], to classify the wa-
termarking attacks into categories, according to the type
of information Eve has access to [14, 35], namely: Wa-
termarked Only Attack (WOA), Known Message Attack
(KMA), Known Original Attack (KOA), and Constant-
Message Attack (CMA). These categories of attacks are
recalled bellow.
Watermark-Only Attack (WOA) occurs when an at-
tacker has only access to several watermarked con-
tents.
Known-Message Attack (KMA) occurs when an at-
tacker has access to several pairs of watermarked
contents and corresponding hidden messages.
Known-Original Attack (KOA) is when an attacker has
access to several pairs of watermarked contents and
their corresponding original versions.
Constant-Message Attack (CMA) occurs when the at-
tacker observes several watermarked contents and
only knows that the unknown hidden message is the
same in all contents.
Levels of security have been recently defined in these
setups. The highest level of security in WOA is called
stego-security [13], whereas chaos-security tends to im-
prove the ability to withstand attacks in KMA, KOA, and
CMA setups [23].
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5.1.3 Stego-security and chaos-security
Stego-security In the prisoner problem of Sim-
mons [40], Alice and Bob are in jail, and they want to,
possibly, devise an escape plan by exchanging hidden
messages in innocent-looking cover contents. These mes-
sages are to be conveyed to one another by a common
warden, Eve, who over-drops all contents and can choose
to interrupt the communication if they appear to be stego-
contents.
The stego-security, defined in this framework, is the
highest security level in WOA setup [13]. To recall it,
we need the following notations:
• K is the set of embedding keys,
• p(X) is the probabilistic model of N0 initial host con-
tents,
• p(Y|K) is the probabilistic model of N0 watermarked
contents with the same embedding key K ∈ K.
In this framework, it is then supposed in this context
that each host content has been watermarked with the
same secret key K and the same embedding function e.
It is now possible to define the notion of stego-security:
Definition 1 (Stego-Security) The embedding function e
is stego-secure if and only if:
∀K ∈ K, p(Y|K) = p(X).
Chaos-security We finally detail the highest level of se-
curity in KMA, KOA, and CMA setups. It is called chaos-
security and is defined as follows.
To check whether an information hiding scheme S is
chaos-secure or not, S must be written as an iterate pro-
cess xn+1 = f (xn) on a metric space (X, d), where the
phase space X is the set of all possible contents and d is a
distance that must be carefully chosen, depending on the
objectives to reach (d(x, y) must be small iff x is undis-
tiguishable from y).
This formulation is always possible [3]. So,
Definition 2 (Chaos-Security) An information hiding
scheme S is said to be chaos-secure on (X, d) if its itera-
tive process has a chaotic behavior according to Devaney.
In other words, the iteration process must satisfy the
following chaos properties:
• iterations of f are regular (i.e., periodic points of f
are dense in X),
• f is topologically transitive (i.e., for any pair of open
sets U,V ⊂ X, there exists some natural number k >
0 s. t. f k(U) ∩ V , ∅),
• f has sensitive dependence on initial conditions (i.e.,
there exists δ > 0 s.t. for any X ∈ X and any neigh-
borhood V of X, there exist Y ∈ V and k > 0 with
d( f k(X), f k(Y)) > δ).
In the approach presented in [23], a data hiding scheme
is secure if it is unpredictable. Its iterative process must
satisfy the Devaney’s chaos property and its level of
chaos-security increases with the number of chaotic prop-
erties satisfied by it.
One of these chaos property, namely the expansivity,
is an important quantitative measure of disorder. It is re-
called below.
Definition 3 A function f is said to have the property of
expansivity if
∃ε > 0,∀x , y,∃n ∈N, d( f n(x), f n(y)) > ε. (3)
Then ε is the constant of expansivity of f : an arbitrarily
small error on any initial condition is always amplified
until ε. It has been proven in [23] that an information
hiding scheme that is not expansive is unable to face an
attacker in KOA and KMA setups [23].
This new concept of security for data hiding schemes
has been proposed in [3] as a complementary approach
to the existing framework. It contributes to the reinforce-
ment of confidence put into existing secure data hiding
schemes. Additionally, the study of security in KMA,
KOA, and CMA setups is realizable in this context. Fi-
nally, this framework can replace stego-security in situa-
tions that are not encompassed by it. In particular, this
framework is more relevant to give evaluation of data hid-
ing schemes claimed as chaotic.
5.2 Application to nodes authentication
We explain in this section why, in our opinion, the frame-
work recalled above is useful for studying wireless sensor
network authentication nodes.
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Digital Watermarking WSN
pixel node
picture network
zeroing attack death of nodes
rotation and resize attacks nodes displacement
uniform or gaussian noise transmission errors
contrast attacks unbalanced signals
blur attacks signal attenuation
Table 7: Relationship between digital watermarking and
WSN
5.2.1 Robustness for authenticated wireless sensor
networks
We now adapt the concepts recalled above for nodes au-
thentication based on information hiding techniques. First
of all, robustness means that the watermark still remains
after geometric and frequency attacks. The interest to
have a robust watermarking for authentication in WSN is
then twofold.
On the one hand, the network is not always fixed and
can possibly evolve over time. Nodes can be moved for
various reasons, some of them can stop to transmit their
sensed and watermarked data (for technical reasons, or
when they have consumed all of their energies), noise
can appear during transmission, and so on. Nevertheless,
the authentication capability of the whole network must
be preserved into the sink, and thus the watermarking
scheme used for authentication must be compliant with
such alterations. That is to say, if the wireless sensor net-
work can be slightly altered for reasonable and natural
reasons, then the authentication scheme must be robust.
Table 7 gives some relationships between geometric and
frequency attacks in the information hiding framework,
and natural alteration of a wireless sensor network.
On the other hand, some information hiding schemes
are robust against image compression attacks like JPEG
or JPEG2000 compressions. Such a resistance is obtained
for instance by inserting the watermark into the DCT or
DCT coefficients of the image instead of using the gray
level of each pixel. The idea formerly proposed by [42]
is to use this resistance for aggregation. Indeed, in situ-
ation of JPEG or JPEG2000 compression resistance, wa-
termarked data sent by sensor nodes can be aggregated
by using a DCT or DWT compression. Due to the ro-
bustness of the well-chosen information hiding scheme
against these attacks, the watermark still remains after
such compressions, and the aggregation preserves authen-
tication.
Furthermore, a fragile watermarking can be useful too
in an information hiding based authentication of nodes
into a WSN. Let us consider for instance that an attacker
adds one of his node into a given wireless sensor net-
work that use a fragile watermarking scheme for authen-
tication. Additionally, we suppose that he can send cor-
rupted sensed values without being detected, either to the
aggregation layer or to the sink. Under this situation, the
“watermarked image” received by the sink will be such
that at least one pixel (i.e., the corrupted node) has not
a correct piece of watermark. Due to the fragility of the
scheme, this alteration will be magnified and the extracted
watermark will be completely different from what was ex-
pected, leading to the detection of the attack. Such a frag-
ile authentication scheme can be useful too in situations
where an attacker tries to modify an authorized node. In
this case, as the node can embeds different pieces of wa-
termark, the sink will be able to detect such anomaly.
Finally, there exist some watermarking schemes that
are fragile in almost all situations, but are robust against
some well defined threats. So fragile and robust prop-
erties can help to choose the best watermarking scheme
for a given WSN authentication context. For instance,
some schemes can be found in the literature that are ro-
bust against JPEG attacks with small compression rate,
but are fragile in all of the other types of attacks. Such
an algorithm is helpful when the network cannot evolve
geographically, must use compression based aggregation,
and is in an hostile environment. As a conclusion, we can
see that using a watermarking scheme for authentication
through WSN is useful in many situations.
5.2.2 Security for authenticated WSN
As robustness, information hiding security can be useful
when authenticating nodes into wireless sensor networks.
The four classes of attacks presented in Section 5.1.2 can
be translated to WSN security as follows.
Watermark-Only Attack (WOA) occurs when an at-
14
tacker has only access to several transmitted authen-
ticated data. That is to say, he can only observe trans-
missions.
Known-Message Attack (KMA) occurs when an at-
tacker has access to several pairs of watermarked
contents and corresponding hidden messages. In
other words, the adversary can observe the transmis-
sions, and has find a way to make an altered node
insert the attacker’s watermark.
Known-Original Attack (KOA) is when an attacker has
access to several pairs of watermarked contents and
their corresponding original versions. That is to say,
the attacker can determine which value a node has
sensed and can see the resulted watermarked data
sent by this node.
Constant-Message Attack (CMA) occurs when the at-
tacker observes several watermarked contents and
only knows that the unknown hidden message is the
same in all contents. In that situation, the adversary
can observe another time the transmitted data. Ad-
ditionally, he knows that always the same watermark
is used to authenticate these data.
Other categories of attacks can be found in the liter-
ature, such as the Estimated-Original Attack. They all
can be translated into the wireless sensor network secu-
rity framework.
The Simmons’ prisoner problem put into the WSN con-
text can be translated too, as follows. Eve observes the
transmission between two nodes called Alice and Bob.
She tries to determine whether a given transmission is au-
thenticated or not. Obviously, this is for her the starting
point of an attack to authentication. For instance, if she
is able to make the difference between authenticated and
unauthenticated data, then she can:
• Replace unauthenticated data with her own values
without being detected.
• Concentrate her efforts on a subset of authenticated
data.
• Try to understand the differences between authenti-
cated and unauthenticated data, with a view to forge
her own “authenticated” values.
• Try to determine, by using statistical models and
tools, the embedding key (the piece of watermark
used to authenticate these values).
• etc.
The stego-security means that such a separation be-
tween authenticated and unauthenticated data is impossi-
ble, as the use of any key does not change the probabilis-
tic model of the transmitted data. Obviously, there is a
lack of security if an authentication scheme of data send-
ing through a WSN, with an adversary being able to ob-
serve transmissions (Simmons’ prisoner problem, WOA
setup), is based on a watermarking algorithm that is not
stego-secure. Similar conclusions can be obtained with
the chaos-security notion in the KOA, KMA, and CMA
setups: if situations covered by these setups can possibly
occur, then the watermarking scheme used for authentica-
tion must be chaos-secure.
To the best of our knowledge, until now, only two data
hiding schemes have been used to authenticate data send-
ing through a WSN. The first one is a spread-spectrum
technique, used in [42]. The second one uses chaotic iter-
ations.
In what follows, these information hiding techniques
are recalled and their security is evaluated.
5.3 Security study of Zhang et al. authenti-
cation scheme
As Zhang et al. nodes authentication scheme for WSN is
based on the spread-spectrum data hiding, we must firstly
recall this technique before studying its security.
5.3.1 Spread-spectrum data hiding techniques
Let x ∈ RNv be a host vector in which we want to hide a
message m ∈ {0, 1}Nc . Nc is the size of the hidden pay-
load (in bits) and Nv the size of the stego or host vector (in
samples). A key K is used to initialize a PRNG (Pseudo-
Random Number Generator) to obtain Nc secret carries
{ui} taken in RNv , which can be supposed to be orthonor-
malized. Thus in classical SS the watermark signal w is
constructed as follows:
w =
Nc−1∑
i=0
γ(−1)miui,
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where γ is a given distortion level. The watermarked sig-
nal y is then defined by:
y = x + w.
Let us now suppose that the components of
the watermark are bounded by a finite value Nb:
max({wi, i ∈ ~1,Nv}) 6 Nb. This bound can be as
large as needed, however a very large Nb seems to be
contradictory with the aims of a data hiding scheme. Let
us consider X =
(
[−Nb,Nb]Nv
)N ×RNv and
G((S,E)) = (σ(S); i(S) + E),
where σ is the shift function defined by
σ : (Sn)n∈N ∈
(
[−Nb,Nb]Nv
)N → (Sn+1)n∈N ∈(
[−Nb,Nb]Nv
)N
and the initial function i is the
map which associates to a sequence, its first term:
i : (Sn)n∈N ∈
(
[−Nb,Nb]Nv
)N → S0 ∈ [−Nb;Nb]Nv . E
will be the vector describing the part of the host that
can be altered without sensitive damages, when S will
give the location of the alteration at each iteration (S will
depend on the hidden message and the secret key).
Spread-spectrum data hiding techniques are thus the re-
sult of Nc iterations of the following dynamical system:{
X0 ∈ X,
Xn+1 = G(Xn),
and the watermarked media is the second component of
XNc . Indeed, the second component of Xk corresponds to
the host image after k alterations, whereas the first com-
ponent explains how to alter it another time.
Classical SS, i.e. with BPSK modulation [13], is de-
fined by X0 = (S0,E0) where E0 is the host vector x and
S0 is the sequence(
(−1)m0γ u0, (−1)m1γ u1, . . . , (−1)mNc−1γ uNc−1
)
,
in which γ allows to achieve a given distortion, whereas
in ISS (Improved Spread Spectrum [32]), S0 is defined by(
(−1)miα − λ< x,u
i >
||ui||2
)
i=0,...,Nc−1
,
where α and λ are computed to achieve an average distor-
tion and to minimize the error probability [13]. Lastly, in
natural watermarking NW, S0 is defined by(
−
(
1 + η(−1)mi < x,u
i >
| < x,ui > |
)
< x,ui >
||ui||2
)
i=0,...,Nc−1
.
This last modulation consists in a model-based projec-
tion on the different vectors ui followed by a η−scaling
along the direction of ui.
Natural watermarking has been proven stego-secure
when η = 1, whereas all of the other spread-spectrum
techniques are not stego-secure (see [13]). Additionally,
this scheme is reputed to be not robust. Finally, these
four techniques are chaos-secure so they can be consid-
ered when facing an attacker in the CMA context [23].
However, as these techniques are not expansive, they are
unable to face an attacker in KOA and KMA setups [23].
5.3.2 Cryptanalysis of the Zhang et al. authentica-
tion scheme
As recalled previously, spread spectrum is known to be
not robust: even if their scheme survives to a certain de-
gree of distortion, spread-spectrum cannot face to ele-
mentary blind attack. Furthermore, spread-spectrum data
hiding techniques are only stego-secure in the ”Natural
Watermarking” situation [13]. The spread-spectrum sub-
class used in [42] is related to classical SS, i.e. with
BPSK modulation [13]. This subclass is neither stego-
secure [13], nor chaos-secure [3]. These lack of security
allow an attacker who observes the network to access to
the secret embedding key in all of the following situations:
WOA, KMA, KOA, and CMA setups.
To improve the security of the network in WOA setup,
the use of Natural Watermarking instead of BPSK mod-
ulation is required [13]. However, Natural Watermarking
is less chaos-secure than the data hiding algorithm pre-
sented in [4]. This algorithm, based on chaotic iterations,
is able to withstand attacks in KMA, KOA and CMA se-
tups [22]. Moreover, this technique is more robust than
spread-spectrum, as it is stated in [2]. To sum up, the use
of the scheme proposed in [4] improves the security and
robustness of the scheme presented in [42]. This algo-
rithm is recalled in the next section and evaluated in the
last one.
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5.4 Information hiding based on chaotic it-
erations
For easy understanding, our information hiding scheme
based on chaotic iteration is explained by using pictures
instead of networks. As there is an equivalency between
pixels and nodes, this discussion and the evaluation of the
next section holds for a wireless sensor network, mutatis
mutandis.
5.4.1 Chaotic iterations
In the sequel Sn denotes the nth term of a sequence S and
Vi is for the ith component of a vector V. Finally, the
following notation is used: ~0;N = {0, 1, . . . ,N}.
Let us consider a system of a finite number N of ele-
ments (or cells), so that each cell has a boolean state. A
sequence of length N of boolean states of the cells corre-
sponds to a particular state of the system. A sequence that
elements belong into ~1;N is called a strategy. The set
of all strategies is denoted by S.
Definition 4 The set B denoting {0, 1}, let f : BN −→
BN be a function and S ∈ S be a strategy. The so-called
chaotic iterations are defined by x0 ∈ BN and ∀(n, i) ∈
N∗ × ~0;N − 1:
xni =
{
xn−1i if S
n , i,(
f (xn−1)
)
Sn
if Sn = i. (4)
5.4.2 Chaotic iterations and Devaney’s chaos
In this section we give outline proofs of the properties on
which our nodes authentication is based. The complete
theoretical framework is detailed in [4].
Denote by ∆ the discrete boolean metric, ∆(x, y) =
0 ⇔ x = y. Given a function f , define the func-
tion: F f : ~1;N × BN −→ BN such that F f (k,E) =(
E j.∆(k, j) + f (E)k.∆(k, j)
)
j∈~1;N.
Let us consider the phase space X = ~1;NN × BN
and the map G f (S,E) =
(
σ(S),F f (i(S),E)
)
, where σ is
defined by σ : (Sn)n∈N ∈ S → (Sn+1)n∈N ∈ S, and i is
the map i : (Sn)n∈N ∈ S → S0 ∈ ~1;N. So the chaotic
iterations can be described by the following iterations:
X0 ∈ X and Xk+1 = G f (Xk).
We have defined in [4] a new distance d between two
points (S,E), (Sˇ, Eˇ) ∈ X by d((S,E); (Sˇ, Eˇ)) = de(E, Eˇ) +
ds(S, Sˇ), where:
• de(E, Eˇ) =
N∑
k=1
∆(Ek, Eˇk) ∈ ~0;N
• ds(S, Sˇ) = 9N
∞∑
k=1
|Sk − Sˇk|
10k
∈ [0; 1].
It is then proven that,
Proposition 1 G f is a continuous function on (X, d).
In the metric space (X, d), the vectorial negation f0 :
BN −→ BN, (b1, · · · , bN) 7−→ (b1, · · · , bN) satisfies the
three conditions for Devaney’s chaos: regularity, transi-
tivity, and sensitivity [4]. So,
Proposition 2 G f0 is a chaotic map on (X, d) according
to Devaney.
To explain how to use chaotic iterations for information
hiding and thus for nodes authentication, we must firstly
define the significance of a given coefficient.
5.4.3 Most and least significant coefficients
We first notice that into each node, the alteration of the
sensed value for authentication must not be important.
That is to say, terms of the original content x that may be
replaced by terms issued from the watermark y are less
important than other: they could be changed without be
perceived as such. More generally, a signification func-
tion attaches a weight to each sensed value, depending on
its position t.
Definition 5 A signification function is a real sequence
(uk)k∈N.
Example 1 To illustrate this notion, we use a picture rep-
resentation of a given WSN. Let us consider a set of
grayscale images stored into portable graymap format
(P3-PGM): each pixel ranges between 256 gray levels,
i.e., is memorized with eight bits. In that context, we
consider uk = 8 − (k mod 8) to be the k-th term of a
signification function (uk)k∈N. Intuitively, in each group
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of eight bits (i.e., for each pixel) the first bit has an impor-
tance equal to 8, whereas the last bit has an importance
equal to 1. This is compliant with the idea that changing
the first bit affects more the image than changing the last
one.
Definition 6 Let (uk)k∈N be a signification function, m
and M be two reals s.t. m <M.
• The most significant coefficients (MSCs) of x is the
finite vector
uM =
(
k
∣∣∣ k ∈ N and uk >M and k ≤| x |) ;
• The least significant coefficients (LSCs) of x is the
finite vector
um =
(
k
∣∣∣ k ∈ N and uk ≤ m and k ≤| x |) ;
• The passive coefficients of x is the finite vector
up =
(
k
∣∣∣ k ∈ N and uk ∈]m;M[ and k ≤| x |) .
For a given WSN x, MSCs are then ranks of x that
describe the relevant part of the sensed values, whereas
LSCs translate its less significant parts. These two defi-
nitions are illustrated on Figure 5, where the significance
function (uk) is defined as in Example 1, M = 5, and
m = 6.
5.4.4 Presentation of the scheme
Authors of [2] have proposed to use chaotic iterations as
an information hiding scheme, as follows. Let:
• (K,N) ∈ [0, 1] ×N be an embedding key,
• X ∈ BN be the N LSCs of a cover C,
• (Sn)n∈N ∈ ~1,NN be a strategy, which depends on
the message to hide M ∈ [0, 1] and K,
• f0 : BN → BN be the vectorial logical negation.
So the watermarked media is C whose LSCs are re-
placed by YK = XN, where:{
X0 = X
∀n < N,Xn+1 = G f0 (Xn) . (5)
(a) Sensed values of a WSN.
(b) MSCs of the WSN. (c) LSCs of the WSN (×17).
Figure 5: Most and least significant coefficients of the
WSN.
To sum up, chaotic iterations are realized on the least
significant part of the sensed values.
Two ways to generate (Sn)n∈N are given by these au-
thors, namely Chaotic Iterations with Independent Strat-
egy (CIIS) and Chaotic Iterations with Dependent Strat-
egy (CIDS). In CIIS, the strategy is independent from the
cover media C, whereas in CIDS the strategy will be de-
pendent on C. As we will use the CIIS strategy in this
document, we recall it below. Finally, MSCs can be used
as a parameter of the CIIS.
5.4.5 CIIS strategy
Let us firstly give the definition of the Piecewise Linear
Chaotic Map (PLCM, see [39]):
F(x, p) =

x/p if x ∈ [0; p],
(x − p)/( 12 − p) if x ∈
[
p; 12
]
,
F(1 − x, p) else,
(6)
where p ∈
]
0; 12
[
is a “control parameter”.
Then, the general term of the strategy (Sn)n in CIIS
setup is defined by the following expression: Sn =
bN × Knc + 1, where:
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UNAUTHENTICATION AUTHENTICATION
Size (pixels) Similarity Size (pixels) Similarity
10 99.08% 10 89.81%
50 97.31% 50 54.54%
100 92.43% 100 52.24%
Table 8: Zeroing attacks.

p ∈
[
0; 12
]
K0 = M ⊗ K
Kn+1 = F(Kn, p),∀n ≤ N0
(7)
in which ⊗ denotes the bitwise exclusive or (XOR) be-
tween two floating part numbers (i.e., between their bi-
nary digits representation), K is (one of) the embedding
key, and M is:
• either the sequence of MSCs, in the particular situ-
ation where each node has access to the other ones
and when a fragile watermarking is needed (Authen-
tication),
• or the rest of the embedding key, when robustness is
required (Unauthentication).
5.5 Our proposed method
To prove the efficiency and the robustness of the proposed
algorithm, some attacks are applied to our chaotic wa-
termarked image. For each attack, a similarity percent-
age with the watermark is computed, this percentage is
the number of equal bits between the original and the ex-
tracted watermark. These results have been formerly ob-
tained in [2].
5.5.1 Zeroing Attack
In this kind of attack, some nodes of the WSN are put to
0. In this case, the results in Table 8 have been obtained.
We can conclude that in case of unauthentication, the wa-
termark still remains after a cropping attack: the desired
robustness is reached. In case of authentication, even a
small change of the carrier sensed values lead to a very
different extracted watermark. In this case, any attempt to
alter the WSN will be signaled.
UNAUTHENTICATION AUTHENTICATION
Angle Similarity Angle Similarity
5 94.67% 5 59.47%
10 91.30% 10 54.51%
25 80.85% 25 50.21%
Table 9: Rotation attacks.
UNAUTHENTICATION AUTHENTICATION
Ratio Similarity Ratio Similarity
2 82.95% 2 54.39%
5 65.23% 5 53.46%
10 60.22% 10 50.14%
Table 10: JPEG compression attacks.
5.5.2 Rotation Attack
Let rθ be the rotation of angle θ around the center
(128, 128) of the carrier image. So, the transformation
r−θ ◦ rθ is applied to the watermarked WSN. The good
results in Table 9 are obtained.
5.5.3 JPEG Compression
A JPEG compression is applied to the sensed values, de-
pending on a compression level. Let us notice that this at-
tack leads to a change of the representation domain (from
spatial to DCT domain). In this case, the results in Ta-
ble 10 have been found. A good authentication through
a compression-based aggregation is obtained. As for the
unauthentication case, the watermark still remains after a
compression level equal to 10. This is a good result if we
take into account the fact that we use “spatial” embedding.
5.5.4 Gaussian Noise
Watermarked image can be also attacked by the addition
of a Gaussian noise, depending on a standard deviation.
In this case, the results in Table 11 have been found.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a two layers secure data aggre-
gation for sensor networks. The first layer is based on data
encryption with homomorphic properties that provide the
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UNAUTHENTICATION AUTHENTICATION
Standard dev. Similarity Standard dev. Similarity
1 74.26% 1 52.05%
2 63.33% 2 50.95%
3 57.44% 3 49.65%
Table 11: Gaussian noise attacks.
possibility to operate on cypher-text. It prevents the de-
cryption phase at the aggregators layers and saves nodes
energy. Existing works have exponential bound in com-
putation and are not suitable for sensor networks, which
we tried to relax in our approach. The proposed scheme
permits the generation of shorter encryption asymmetric
keys, which is so important in the case of sensor networks.
The second layer proposes a watermarking-based authen-
tication scheme. The distinct advantage of this layer is
to achieve end-to-end authentication where the sink can
directly validate the received data from the sources. The
experimental results show that our method significantly
reduces computation and communication overhead com-
pared to other works, and can be practically implemented
in on-the-shelf sensor platforms.
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